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Abstract 
This paper attempts to shed a new light on the insider trading issue by studying the 
unintended effects of insider trading laws. It shows that government regulation of insider trading 
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that insider trading laws instead of mitigating the agency problems that have been associated with 
insider trading actually can aggravate them by hindering the effectiveness of governance 
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31 Introduction 
A classic economic argument advanced in favor of prohibiting insider trading2 is that 
it gives rise to agency problems. The ability to access material nonpublic information 
about the corporation and profit from swings in corporation's stock prices provides 
insiders with incentives to maximize their own welfare at the expense of corporation's 
shareholders. 
This paper addresses this argument and shows that insider trading laws can actually 
make the problems they intend to resolve worse.  It shows that insider trading laws 
aggravate the agency problems associated with insider trading. Insider trading laws 
hinder the effectiveness of governance mechanisms existing within and outside the firm. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the agency-problem based 
arguments in favor of publicly regulating insider trading. Section 3 shows how insider 
trading laws impair the system of governance within the firm. Section 4 shows how 
insider trading laws reduce the effectiveness of governance mechanisms outside the firm. 
Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
2 Insider Trading as Agency Problem 
Following Henry Manne's plea in favor of legalizing insider trading (Manne 1966), 
several authors offered several counter-arguments to justify the public regulation of 
insider trading. With the development of information economics and the analysis of 
markets with asymmetric information, some authors argued that the decision to allow or 
not to allow insider trading should not be left in the hands of corporate shareholders.  
Focusing on the work and conclusions of the principal-agent literature, these authors 
argue that insider trading gives rise to agency problems that are impossible to solve 
 
2 We use the standard definition of insider trading adopted in the literature, which is the use of material 
nonpublic information about a corporation in a securities transaction. Insiders are traditionally defined as 
any individual who has access or has been given access to inside information. The American legislation 
uses the same definition of insider trading. However, it introduces a distinction within the class of insiders 
by differentiating registered (inside) insiders from (unregistered) outside insiders (tippees). Registered 
insiders (or corporate insiders) are defined by the Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as 
every director and officer of the corporation plus any owners of more than 10% of the corporation's equity. 
They are required by the Section 16(a) to report periodically all their trade in equity securities to the SEC. 
Unregistered insiders (or outside-insiders) are also in possession of material nonpublic information but are 
not required to report their transactions to the SEC. Unregistered insiders' acquisition of inside information 
can be direct in the course of their work (investment bankers, lawyers, risk arbitragers, accountants, 
financial printers) or indirect by the intermediary of registered insiders (tippees). 
4through self-regulation. They argue that self-regulation cannot be implemented 
principally because shareholders lack "adequate enforcement devices" (Easterbrook 1981, 
pp. 333-34; emphasis added) that can cope with the problems generated by the existence 
of information asymmetries and the fact that insider trading is virtually undetectable. As a 
consequence, agency problems emerge. 
This lack of adequate enforcement mechanisms results in shareholders, particularly in 
corporations allowing their insiders to trade on inside information, facing agency 
problems associated with insider trading. Allowing insider trading provide shareholders' 
agents with perverse incentives that may lower long-term firm value and, consequently, 
harm the shareholders. Because they can profit from bad and good news without having 
to bear the costs of their decisions, shareholders' agents are indifferent to working to 
increase or to lower firm value. As a consequence, they have incentives to adopt non-
value-maximizing behaviors (Levmore 1982, p. 149; Mendelson 1969, pp. 489-90; 
Posner 1978, p. 308; Schotland 1967, p. 1451). For example, they may increase the 
volatility of the firm's stock prices by engaging in activities involving investment and 
production decisions to destabilize firm performance to take advantage of stock price 
swings (Easterbrook 1981, p. 312; Brudney 1979, p. 156; and Masson and Madhavan 
1991, p. 335). 
In order to increase the volatility of the corporation's stock prices and capture the 
gains from stock price swings, insiders can also manipulate information about 
performance (Masson and Madhavan 1991, p. 334, fn. 6; Posner 1978, p. 308). They may 
delay transmitting material information to their superior in order to trade on it and make a 
profit (Haft 1982, p. 1051). 
Because of all these problems, these authors argue that insider trading should be 
publicly regulated with no possibility of opting out in the interest of protecting 
shareholders against the opportunistic behaviors of unscrupulous insiders.3 As the 
following sections will show, insider trading laws reveal counterproductive in the sense 
that they aggravate the problems that they intend to mitigate. 
 
3 While it is beyond the scope of this paper, one might wonder why the government or any governmental 
agency would be more effective than the market in regulating insider trading if insider trading is virtually 
undetectable. What are those detection mechanisms that the government would implement to detect insider 
trading that any private organization or corporation could not? 
53 The Unintended Effects of Insider Trading Laws within the Corporation 
This section investigates the impact of insider trading laws on the system of corporate 
governance within the corporation. It shows how insider trading laws are likely to 
aggravate the agency problems that insider trading may pose by discouraging active 
shareholding and, hence, impairing the system of corporate governance. 
3.1 The Importance of Active Shareholding within the System of Corporate Governance 
Active shareholding is traditionally considered a fundamental mechanism to mitigate 
agency problems within the corporation. Active shareholders play a key role within the 
system of corporate governance by internally monitoring the activity of corporation's 
managers. In doing so, active shareholders help mitigating agency costs and contribute to 
enhancing the corporation's value (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Because they own larger 
blocks of stocks, large shareholders are more likely to sit on the board of directors and, 
hence, exercise some influence over management (Demsetz 1986, p. 313).  
In addition, their position allows them to access to inside information and assess more 
accurately managers' performance. This ability to supervise managers' activity is 
important for large shareholders because they bear more risk and cost than minority 
shareholders, particularly in firms exhibiting high firm-specific risk.4
To be sure, active shareholding can only exist if the benefits from owning large 
blocks of stocks and participating actively in monitoring the management from within the 
corporation outweigh the costs. Alternatively, when costs of active shareholding 
outweigh the benefits, the incentives to take an active role in the corporate governance 
system disappear. 
3.2 The Effects of Insider Trading Laws on Active Shareholding 
A careful analysis of insider trading laws can show the impact of those laws on the 
system of corporate governance and, particularly active shareholding. Such laws have 
 
4 Firm-specific risk manifests in environments where there are frequent changes in relative prices, 
technology, and market shares. Such risk involves higher monitoring costs than in firms operating in 
environments characterized by stable prices, stable technology, and stable market shares because it is more 
difficult to disentangle the effects of managers' decisions on firm performance from these exogenous often 
unpredictable factors that also affect the firm performance (Demsetz and Lehn 1985, p. 1159). Because of 
this latter problem, having access to inside information becomes a crucial factor to help large shareholders 
to disentangle the endogenous from the exogenous effects that affect the firm performance. 
6unintended effects on active shareholding that translate by the fact that they burden large 
shareholders with additional costs other than those associated with large shareholding. 
For instance, in pursuance to Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
owners of more than 10% of equity are considered as insiders along with every officer 
and director of the corporation. Additionally, Section 16(a) requires them to report all 
their trades in equity securities on a monthly basis to the Securities Exchange 
Commission and the exchange if the security is registered on a national securities 
exchange. Section 16(b) – the insider's short-swing profit rule – prohibits insiders from 
trading when the purpose is to realize short-term profits, resulting from the purchase and 
sale of securities in a six-month period, except in very limited circumstances.5 Finally, 
Section 16(c) prohibits short sales of stock.  
As a result, the restrictions that accompany the insider status as defined in Section 
16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 impose additional costs on large 
shareholders such as the reporting of their transactions, having to justify their actions, and 
facing potential legal costs. Alone, the short-swing profit rule imposes significant 
restrictions on large shareholders' trading, particularly, for the institutional investors such 
as corporate and pension funds, which need to protect the liquidity of their holdings. Also 
the short-sale prohibition can be detrimental in the sense that it does not allow large 
shareholders to liquidate their holdings when they received negative information. 
All these additional liabilities and restrictions increase the higher risk and cost that 
large shareholders already incur in comparison to minority shareholders. They increase 
the risk for large shareholders to suffer larger losses particularly when unpredictable 
exogenous factors dramatically affect the firm performance. As previously explained, by 
sitting on the board of directors, active shareholders, benefiting from access to inside 
information, can timely proceed to sweeping changes when necessary. However, 
sometimes, short selling can be the only solution for large shareholders to minimize their 
losses. By prohibiting short selling, large shareholders see themselves deprived of an 
 
5 An important note regarding Section 16(b) is that it presumes that any succession of two transactions in 
the opposite direction (purchase/sale or sale/purchase) realized in a period less than six months, is 
necessarily and indisputably based on the use of inside information. As a consequence of this automatic 
causality established between transactions in the opposite direction and use of inside information, Section 
16(b) does not require that a proof is established that there was use of inside information (George 1976, p. 
40). 
7important alternative. In addition, the benefits of having access to private information and 
exercising an active role in firm governance decrease in comparison to those of passive 
(minority) shareholders who do not have to support either the initial costs of investing in 
monitoring the management team or the additional costs generated by insider-trading 
laws but still benefit from the active role exercised by large shareholders in firm 
governance. 
As a result, incentives for investors to hold larger blocks of stocks disappear. Instead, 
they prefer to keep their ownership below the 10% level and avoid triggering the insider 
status (Roe 1990, pp. 17-18; Seyhun 1998, p. 31). As Bhide (1993, p. 37) observes: 
My interviews with corporate and pension fund managers suggest that investors are 
often reluctant to receive any private information from managers (let alone take on 
board positions) which they believe would compromise their fiduciary responsibility 
to protect the liquidity of their holdings. Institutions also stay below the 10% 
ownership limit that triggers the Section 16(b) restrictions on short-term trading. 
Insider trading and disclosure rules … thus have serious consequences for 
governance because they limit liquidity for active stockholders: many large investors 
who own sizeable blocks and could play and active role are instead resolutely 
passive. 
Moreover, by discouraging large shareholders from owning large blocks of stocks and 
playing an active role (by sitting on the board of directors), insider-trading laws have an 
impact on the structure of the board of directors and reduce board's incentives to monitor 
effectively the managers. Hart (1995, pp. 681-82) describes the problem as follows: 
The board consists of executive directors (who are members of the management 
team); and nonexecutive directors, who are outsiders. On the one hand, it would 
hardly be reasonable to expect the directors to monitor themselves. On the other 
hand, nonexecutive directors may not do a very good job of monitoring for several 
reasons. First, they may not have a significant financial interest in the company, and 
they may therefore have little to gain personally from improvements in company 
performance. Second, nonexecutive directors are busy people (they may themselves 
be chief executives and sit on many boards) and probably have little time to think 
about company's affairs, or to collect information about the company – over and 
above that provided by the management. Finally, nonexecutive directors may owe 
their positions to management, who proposed them as directors in the first place. As 
well as feeling loyal to management, they may want to stay in management's good 
graces, so that they can be re-elected and continue to collect their fees. 
8By discouraging large ownership and active monitoring by large shareholders, not 
only do insider trading laws change the structure of the board of directors, but they also 
reduce the board members' incentives in monitoring effectively the management. Instead, 
board members with little wealth invested in the corporation and, consequently, less 
interest in investing in monitoring decision-making, are more likely to collude with the 
management at the expense of shareholders. 
The definition of inside information has also a negative impact on active 
shareholding.6 The American legislation as well as the European legislation define inside 
information as price sensitive information. The consequences are the same as with the 
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
To play an active role in the governance of the corporation, large shareholders or 
institutional investors need to have access to confidential price-sensitive information. 
However, playing an active role also means to become an insider and compromise the 
liquidity of his holdings, which is very problematic for the institutional investors and 
other intermediaries that have a fiduciary responsibility with regard to their own 
stockholders. As a consequence, large investors will refuse to receive any price-sensitive 
information and bar themselves from performing any active role in the corporation's 
governance (ISC 1991). Beny (1999) provides empirical evidence that are consistent with 
our argument that insider trading laws discourage large shareholders and, hence, inside 
monitoring. She shows that countries where insider trading laws exist and are enforced 
exhibit lower ownership concentration than in other countries. She also shows that the 
 
6 The literature and legal scholars tend to establish a difference between both definitions arguing that the 
European legislation by adopting a narrow definition of inside information creates a "grey zone," allowing 
insiders to trade on some inside information (Maug 1999, p. 3, 21). A careful look at both definitions shows 
that they are actually not different. Following the Supreme Court, the U.S. insider trading laws define 
inside information as "material" and "non-public." On the other hand, the European legislation defines 
inside information as "information which has not been made public of a precise nature relating to one or 
several issuers of transferable securities or to one or several transferable securities, which, if it were made 
public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the transferable security or securities in 
question" (Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989, Article 1 § 1). The difference between 
both definitions would lie in the fact that the EU directive on insider trading requires inside information to 
be "precise." However, this distinction only appears to be a simple difference of jargon in the sense that the 
U.S. Supreme Court defines "material" information as information of which disclosure to the public would 
be likely to have an impact on the price of the security in question (George 1979, 119-126). This definition 
is therefore not different than the European legislation's one. 
9tougher insider trading laws are the lower is the ownership concentration among large 
shareholders.  
By deterring large shareholders from playing an active role in corporate governance, 
insider-trading laws deprive the shareholders of an important governance mechanism that 
inside monitoring is. Accordingly, the system of corporate governance is impaired. The 
effective controls on self-serving behavior from managers being weakened, corporate 
managers will have more latitude to make self-interested and not-necessarily-value-
maximizing decisions at the expense of the shareholders. In other words, by discouraging 
active shareholding, insider trading laws create the opposite of the intended effects. They 
do not protect shareholders against the agency problems raised by insider trading, they 
actually aggravate those problems.  
The Counter-Argument: Collusion, Bribery, and Information Disclosure 
Ernst Maug (1999) argues that allowing large shareholders to trade on inside 
information eliminate their incentives to monitor underperforming companies. Maug 
argues that in an environment where insider trading is not regulated, dominant 
shareholders will collude with the managers at the expense of minority shareholders. On 
the other hand, in a regulated environment, the interests of large shareholders are aligned 
with those of minority shareholders. To put it in another way, when insider trading is not 
regulated, managers would have incentives to communicate in advance inside 
information about negative developments to the large shareholders, thus allowing them to 
sell their stocks at inflated market prices instead of monitoring the managers. In an 
unregulated environment, managers are going to bribe large shareholders with 
information to refrain from monitoring in order to protect their rents. This collusion 
between large shareholders and managers will be at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Moreover, Maug (1999, p. 2; emphasis added) adds: 
If insider trading is prohibited, then dominant shareholders have a stronger incentive 
to become informed and monitor the company. Trading profits from inside 
information are an opportunity cost of monitoring, and prohibition of trading 
eliminates this opportunity cost. More precise information allows dominant 
shareholders to target companies accurately and to reduce the likelihood of costly 
interventions to that are not profitable. In the optimal environment the company has 
to disclose all material information to the market in a timely manner. Then outside 
monitors make optimal decisions, and the likelihood of monitoring and the value of 
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the firm are maximized, whereas managers' benefits from control are minimized. 
Hence, mandatory disclosure aligns the incentives of dominant shareholders with 
those of small shareholders at the expense of managements' benefits from control.  
According to Maug, a regulation of insider trading combined with a "maximal" 
mandatory disclosure policy will lead to an efficient governance system maximizing the 
firm value. However, Maug's reasoning does not take into account several problems that 
undermine his argument.  
First, Maug argues that large shareholders will prefer to sell their stocks at inflated 
market prices than to intervene in the company because monitoring costs and its benefits 
are lower. Maug may be correct but there is an important variable that is likely to affect 
large shareholders' decision to sell their stocks. Large shareholders face significant capital 
gain taxes upon sale (Bhide 1993, p. 37). When this fact is taken into account, the 
outcome of the cost-benefit analysis is not that obvious. As Shleifer and Vishny (1986, p. 
478) emphasize, large shareholders engage in monitoring because they prefer dividends 
while small shareholders favor capital gains because of tax considerations. 
In addition, Maug overlooks the fact that, by liquidating their holdings in an 
unregulated environment, large shareholders send a market signal, resulting in a price 
change initiated by the large volume of selling, to the various market participants 
regarding the future value of the firm. This price signal sent to the market will also 
inform other investors such as outside stockholders, outside monitors or takeover 
specialists of the future value of the firm. On the other hand, in a regulated environment, 
large shareholders, because they are legally considered insiders, will hide their 
transactions.7 As a consequence, market participants will receive a relatively noisier 
signal that is more difficult to interpret. The noisier the signal, the more difficulties will 
market participants have to interpret it and, therefore, the less likely an outside 
intervention will take place. 
Another problem with Maug's argument is his assumption that by prohibiting insider 
trading, large shareholders will have incentives to become informed and monitor 
 
7 Seyhun and Bradley (1997: 211-14) provide empirical evidence that insiders sell in advance their stocks 
in firms experiencing financial difficulties and in firms filing a bankruptcy petition despite the regulation of 
insider trading exists. See also Meulbroek (1992) who provides evidence that the managers of some firms 
in financial distress sell their shares without reporting their trades to the SEC. 
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managers' activities. As mentioned above, many large shareholders are institutional 
investors who need to protect the liquidity of their holdings in order to comply with the 
fiduciary duty that they owe to their own shareholders. Having access to confidential 
information is a necessity for active shareholders to monitor effectively the company 
performance. However, it is possible that nothing can be done to rectify the problem or it 
would be too costly to do so. The only solution is to sell in order to avoid suffering great 
losses. If large shareholders see their ability to minimize their losses in some extreme 
circumstances precluded, they are not going to sacrifice the liquidity of their holdings 
and, therefore. will reduce the size of their ownership and abstain from engaging in inside 
monitoring. 
As we have seen, empirical evidence shows that insider-trading laws increase the 
dispersion of ownership. As a consequence serious problems of collective action appear. 
As Bhide (1993, p. 45) explains: 
If the proportion of the firm's equity held by diffuse investors is subsequently 
increased … liquidity increases because of the large number of stockholders. 
However, incentives for the blockholders to provide inside monitoring decline 
because the blockholders do not receive the full returns from their investment in 
monitoring. When stockholding is fully diffused, the firm's stock is likely to be the 
most liquid, but inside monitoring by stockholders is out of question. 
Finally, Maug argues if the firm is compelled to disclose all material information to 
the public in a timely manner, outside monitors would be able to make optimal decisions 
in order to maximize the value of the firm. The problem with this assumption is that, 
again, not all material information can be released to the market. Sometimes, some 
material information needs to be kept confidential and cannot be revealed to the public 
particularly when the market where the corporation operates is very competitive. 
4 How Insider Trading Laws Affect Corporate Governance Outside the Firm 
As we have seen, insider trading laws do have detrimental effects on active 
shareholding. However, on might argue that active shareholding is not the only 
mechanism to discipline managers. Other mechanisms exist to compensate for the lack of 
active shareholding. Managerial competition, market for corporate control, competition, 
and proxy fights are examples of market-based disciplinary mechanisms. As argued in 
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Padilla (2002, pp. 14-22), these mechanisms are vital to minimize managers' control and 
reduce their abilities to adopt opportunistic behaviors. For example, Rappaport (1990, p. 
5) states:  
It is impossible to overstate how deeply the market for corporate control has changed 
the attitudes and practices of U.S. managers. … It represents the most effective check 
on management autonomy ever devised. 
However, even if the takeover mechanism can be a powerful mechanism to discipline 
the managers, it cannot substitute for active shareholding. As Bhide (1993, p. 44) 
comments: 
Acquirers who make unsolicited tender offers operate under significant informational 
constraints: they have to raise money deal by deal, making their case from publicly 
available data. Even at the peak in 1985-1987, these acquirers posed a threat to only a 
small number of diversified firms whose break-up values could be reliably 
determined from public data to be significantly higher than their market values. 
Moreover, insider trading laws also have unintended consequences on takeover 
mechanism that may impair its effectiveness. Beny (1999) shows that, by reducing 
ownership concentration, insider trading laws increase indirectly the cost of acquiring a 
majority of shares in a given company. In the context of takeovers, less ownership 
concentration increases the benefits from free riding and makes acquisitions more 
expensive (Bris 2000, p. 18; Scharfstein 1988, pp. 194-95).  
Insider trading laws, by reducing ownership concentration and discouraging active 
monitoring, have also a serious impact on the proxy fight mechanism, which is used to 
remove an "inefficient" board of directors. Active monitoring and proxy fights are closely 
interconnected mechanisms when there are costs to find that the company is 
underperforming. These mechanisms are also used to explain company's 
underperformance. These costs are usually lower for active shareholders because they sit 
on the board of directors and have regular access to the kind of information necessary to 
perform this kind of tasks, namely, confidential information. On the other hand, these 
costs become higher for passive shareholders who do not access such information 
because they are not members of the board of directors.  
Furthermore, the more dispersed the ownership, the more costly it is to locate the 
names and addresses of shareholders, to mail out ballots, and to persuade each 
13
shareholder of the merits of the dissident slate. On the other hand, the benefits of an 
improved management will accrue to all shareholders. As a consequence, if the dissident, 
after performing his "cost-benefit analysis", believes that his costs are higher than the 
expected benefits of launching a proxy fight, he will not launch the proxy fight and, 
instead will liquidate his assets. Moreover, since the benefits of an improved management 
are shared by all shareholders, free riding problems are also likely to arise, and the proxy 
fight is more likely to fail if small shareholders rationally refuse to undertake the proxy 
fight (Hart 1995, pp. 682-83). Consequently, the management feeling immune to such a 
mechanism is going to take advantage of its entrenched position and make self-serving 
discretionary decisions. 
Passive shareholders, outside stockholders, analysts, or takeover specialists suffer 
from a disadvantage in comparison to active shareholders. They do not have the same 
access (or costs to access) to the inside information required to properly disentangle the 
endogenous effects (those resulting from managerial decisions) from the exogenous 
effects (those due to unpredictable random factors) that affect the firm's performance 
(Bhide 1994, p. 136). Accessing inside information is however a crucial factor to perform 
effective monitoring and effectively implement the necessary measures in a timely 
manner. Therefore, the higher the costs of accessing such information and disciplining 
the management, the lower the likelihood that these individuals are going to make costly 
decisions to displace entrenched managers pursuing their own interests at the expense of 
stockholders. This is true, particularly if these individuals have to share the benefits of 
their actions with other free-riding shareholders. The general result does not vary because 
entrenched managers will benefit from this situation and continue to make self-serving 
decisions at the expense of shareholders. 
An additional problem arises through another insider trading law.  By preventing 
anyone in possession of inside information from trading in the securities of firms 
involved in a takeover, Rule 14e(3) limits the ability of acquirers to have recourse to 
arbitrageurs to assemble blocks easily. 
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5 Conclusion 
Some authors argue that insider trading gives rise to agency problems impossible to 
solve through self-regulation. They argue that self-regulation cannot be efficiently 
implemented because corporate shareholders lack adequate enforcement devices. 
Therefore, they maintain that public regulation of insider trading should be implemented. 
This paper offers a novel argument in the debate on insider trading by analyzing the 
unintended effects of insider trading laws on the system of corporate governance within 
and outside the firm. The analysis shows that outlawing of insider trading cannot but 
produce the opposite of the intended effects. Insider trading laws have detrimental effects 
on the system of corporate governance and aggravate existing agency problems within 
the corporation.  
Such analysis also draws some implications for further empirical research on insider 
trading. There is no doubt that both insider trading and insider trading laws have (agency) 
costs. Ultimately the question to answer is: are agency costs associated with insider 
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